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INTRODUCTION
During a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Environ-
ment and the Economy, Congressman Cory Gardner asked an En-
vironmental Protection Agency ("EPA") official, "Is it standard
procedure for an economic analysis to ignore the impact on jobs?"'
Gardner was referring to the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis,
which does not take into account the effect of environmental regu-
lations on employment. The EPA official was unable to deliver a
coherent answer, and the "who's on first" routine that followed be-
came a hit in the wonkier corners of the Internet.
The question was a good one, and yet it is not surprising that the
EPA official had such trouble answering it. Cost-benefit analysis,
as traditionally performed and as it appears in textbooks,2 does not
take into account employment effects.' Cost-benefit analysis of a
regulation compares the benefits for the public with the costs of
complying with the regulation. The benefits of an environmental
regulation, for example, take the form of improvements to human
health; the costs are measured in terms of losses to consumers and
shareholders.
Yet there is no obvious reason for excluding unemployment
costs from cost-benefit analysis. These costs are no different ana-
lytically from the costs incurred by consumers and shareholders.
The Obama administration itself has directed agencies to take into
' Energyandcommerce, EPA Admits Jobs Don't Matter, YouTube (Apr. 14, 2011).
See, e.g., Harry F. Campbell & Richard P. C. Brown, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Fi-
nancial and Economic Appraisal Using Spreadsheets, at xi (2003); Edward M. Gram-
lich, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis 8 (2d ed. 1998); E.J. Mishan, Elements of
Cost-Benefit Analysis 15 (1972); Edith Stokey & Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for
Policy Analysis 155 (1978).
3 E.g., EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: National Emission Standards for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process
Heaters, at 4-6 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/
RIAs/boilersriafinalllO221_psg.pdf ("A stand-alone analysis of jobs is not included in
a standard cost-benefit analysis.").
[Vol. 98:579580
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account job loss when evaluating regulations, as did the Clinton
administration before it.' Agencies have long reported the pre-
dicted unemployment effects of regulations and have in some cases
declined to choose certain regulatory options because the unem-
ployment effects were too high. But they do not incorporate the
unemployment costs into cost-benefit analysis, which is the stan-
dard basis for evaluating regulations, so it is not clear what role un-
employment plays in their evaluations of proposed regulations.
Some commentators agree with Congressman Gardner that
agencies' failure to take into account employment effects is a de-
fect in cost-benefit analysis. Professor David Driesen, for example,
has led a campaign to revive feasibility analysis, a rival to cost-
benefit analysis that takes into account the employment effects of a
regulation.6 Under feasibility analysis, the agency must issue regu-
lations that are as strict as possible up until the point at which fac-
tories are shut down and workers are laid off. While vague on
where that point is-on how many jobs must be lost before a regu-
lation becomes "infeasible"-feasibility analysis does put the focus
on jobs rather than on costs to consumers.
'See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (directing
agencies to "protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while pro-
moting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation"); see also
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)
(directing agencies to take into account the costs and benefits of intended regulations,
and defining significant regulatory actions as those with a material adverse effect on
jobs).
'Government documents that direct agencies to use cost-benefit analysis and de-
scribe the procedure do not address employment effects. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and
Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal
Entities 36-38 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/inforeg/2011 cb/2011_cbareport.pdf (citing academic literature on the relation-
ship between regulation and job growth but not describing the employment effects of
regulations discussed in the report); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Info. & Reg.
Affairs, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12,866
§ III (B)-(C) (1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg-riaguide.
6 See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 35-38, 51 (2005).
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We have criticized feasibility analysis in another paper and will
not detail those criticisms here. 7 The obvious problem with feasibil-
ity analysis in the present context is that it provides no basis for de-
termining whether the job displacement associated with a regula-
tory option is socially excessive. Another problem is its reliance on
thresholds: a regulation that does not cause massive unemployment
may still be socially undesirable because it produces marginal regu-
latory benefits that are less than the costs of the less-than-massive
unemployment that the regulation does cause. Cost-benefit analy-
sis provides a method for comparing the costs and benefits of regu-
lations without relying on artificial thresholds, and so would seem
to provide an appropriate procedure for taking into account unem-
ployment costs along with all the other effects of regulations.
Currently, the Office of Management and Budget's Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") appears to engage in
what we will call "job-loss analysis," even for regulations that are
not governed by feasibility analysis.9 Under the current approach,
agencies must issue both a cost-benefit analysis and a job-loss
analysis, and may issue a regulation only if it satisfies both analy-
ses. However, as we will discuss, it is not at all clear what the stan-
dard is for job-loss analysis-that is, how many jobs must be lost
for a regulation to be impermissible.
Our conclusions can be easily summarized. We speculate (but
cannot document) that cost-benefit analysis does not take into ac-
count job losses because the economists who developed cost-
benefit analysis made classical assumptions that labor markets
"clear"-that workers who lose their jobs can quickly obtain new
jobs at equal wages."0 On this view, losses incurred by workers who
See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis,
77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2010) (arguing that feasibility analysis has no normative basis
and should not be used to evaluate regulatory options).
'The OIRA is responsible for reviewing agency regulations and "ensur[ing] consis-
tency with the goals of the Administration," among other requirements. Nicholas
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1264 (2006) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,498 § 1(d), 3 C.F.R.
323, 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No.
.12,866) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1263-67 (describing the history
and role of the OIRA).
9 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 646.
10 Or, alternatively, that even if labor markets do not clear, it is too difficult to factor
unemployment costs into the analysis. Cf. Robert Haveman & John Krutilla, Unem-
[Vol. 98:579
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must search for new jobs are rounding errors in cost-benefit analy-
ses that involve costs and benefits in the tens or hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. However, recent literature has made clear that un-
employment costs are high and persistent. A senior worker who is
laid off will on average experience a long-term reduction in income
of as much as twenty percent, probably because the worker loses
significant firm- and industry-specific human capital as a result of
the layoff." We suggest that the cost to workers of unemployment
could be as high as $100,000 per worker. If that figure were used in
cost-benefit analyses, many regulations would need to be revised
and made less stringent. But the precise level of the figure depends
on many factors, such as demographics and industry structure, so it
would be premature to use the $100,000 figure or any other figure
in regulatory cost-benefit analyses. Agencies should collect infor-
mation about the nature of job loss caused by proposed regula-
tions, better estimate these layoffs, and incorporate unemployment
costs in cost-benefit analyses of major regulations.12
ployment, Excess Capacity, and Benefit-Cost Investment Criteria, 49 Rev. Econ. &
Stat. 382, 382 (1967) (noting empirical hurdles to accounting for employment effects
in the "costs of project construction"). It is also possible that unemployment costs
were considered too remote and insufficiently proximate to regulation to justify in-
cluding in cost-benefit analysis. Cf. William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and
Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. Legal
Stud. 347, 359, 364-65 (1986) (discussing a similar problem relating to economic loss
in torts); Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another
Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. Legal Stud. 249, 273-75 (1991) (same). The
Haveman & Krutilla Article focuses on government projects which are not cost-
justified when full employment exists, but may be when unemployment makes the
opportunity cost of labor zero. Our Article looks at the flip side of this question: not
whether government projects should be used when unemployment is high but
whether government regulation should be reduced when unemployment is high.
" See infra text accompanying notes 117-18.
2 This Article is related to, but has a different focus from, the "jobs vs. environ-
ment" literature. This literature examines whether environmental, regulation has
caused job loss and generally finds mixed evidence of such an effect, albeit for the
limited group of industries that have been studied, and only with respect.to environ-
mental regulation rather than other forms of regulation, like occupational safety regu-
lation. See Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations
on Polluting Industries, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 379, 397 (2000) (finding that strict regulation
affects plants in polluting industries by reducing the construction of new plants in
those industries by 26% to 45% in nonattainment areas); Eli Berman & Linda T.M.
Bui, Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast
Air Basin, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 265, 269 (2001) (finding no evidence that local air quality
regulation substantially reduced employment); Matthew A. Cole & Rob J. Elliott, Do
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There is no obvious ideological valence to incorporating unem-
ployment costs into cost-benefit analysis. Introducing additional
costs into the analysis would in many instances militate against
more stringent regulation. On the other hand, it would do so in the
interests of preserving primarily working-class jobs. There have
traditionally been strong political associations between the promo-
tion of stringent regulation and the preservation of working-class
jobs; our approach complicates that linkage by suggesting that
those two goals often must be traded off against one another. As
noted above, this tradeoff is already reflected in feasibility analysis.
Our argument is that cost-benefit analysis performs this tradeoff
more accurately and completely from the standpoint of social wel-
fare by taking into account all relevant benefits and costs and
avoiding reliance on arbitrary thresholds.
Environmental Regulations Cost Jobs? An Industry-Level Analysis of the UK, 7 B.E.
J. Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, Iss. 1, Art. 28, at 3 (2007), available at
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2007.7.1/bejeap.2007.7.1.1668/bejeap.2007.7.1
.1668.xml (finding that "environmental regulation costs do not have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on employment levels"); Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Envi-
ronmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. Pol. Econ. 1175, 1176,
1178 (2002) (finding that between 1972 and 1987, "nonattainment counties" regulated
heavily under the Clean Air Act lost approximately 590,000 jobs and $75 billion of
output in pollution-intensive industries more than the less-regulated "attainment
counties"); Matthew E. Kahn, Particulate Pollution Trends in the United States, 27
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 87, 105 (1997) (finding county- and plant-level evidence
that particulate regulation slightly lowered economic activity); Richard D. Morgen-
stern et al., Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective, 43 J. Envtl.
Econ. & Mgmt. 412, 413-14 (2002) (finding that increased environmental spending in
response to strict environmental policies generally does not cause a significant change
in employment); W. Reed Walker, Environmental Regulation and Labor Realloca-
tion: Evidence from the Clean Air Act, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 442, 443
(2011) (finding negative effects on employment from Clean Air Act amendments
adopted in 1990). These results can be interpreted in many ways. They might suggest
that governments deliberately minimize regulation in order to avoid job loss or that,
as a matter of practice, regulations that emerge from the political process have a lim-
ited impact on jobs. But the literature does not address how governments should
regulate in order to take into account the costs of unemployment. That is the goal of
this Article.
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I. UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE REGULATORY STATE
A. The Varying Agency Approaches to Unemployment
The costs of unemployment have never figured into cost-benefit
analyses performed by regulatory agencies. But that is not to say
that agencies always ignore employment effects when they regu-
late. On the contrary, the vast majority of regulations include some
assessment of the regulation's effect on employment. In some
cases, this assessment is part of the agency's feasibility analysis-its
inquiry into whether a regulation is both technologically and eco-
nomically feasible. 3 In other cases, a job-loss analysis is conducted
in parallel with a cost-benefit analysis.
A wide spectrum of federal regulatory statutes demand that
agencies conduct some form of feasibility analysis, which is an in-
quiry into whether complying with a putative regulation will prove
economically feasible for the affected industry.'4 Courts have inter-
preted this requirement to mean that a regulation must not bank-
rupt a large proportion of firms in that industry;'5 academic de-
fenders of feasibility analysis have similarly described the
requirement as one that prevents regulation that would cause
"widespread plant shutdowns."' 6 Neither of these requirements
necessarily implicates unemployment-workers at firms that close
might be hired by the firms that remain open or be absorbed into
other industries. Nevertheless, agencies have understood them-
selves as obligated to analyze the unemployment effects of regula-
tion directly.
As for job-loss analysis, there is no academic literature or public
discussion of this approach as far as we are aware. In practice, it
amounts to a prediction about the number of jobs that will be lost
as a result of a regulation, along with an implicit threshold for the
" Agencies believe that feasibility analysis is mandated by law, a conclusion that we
have called into question. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 667.
"Id. at 657.
"United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[A]s for
economic feasibility, OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs
and demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that these costs will not threaten the exis-
tence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does portend disaster for some
marginal firms.").
16 Driesen, supra note 6, at 3; see also Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in
the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1097, 1102 n.37 (2006).
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level of job loss that is unacceptable. Although feasibility and job-
loss analysis are different, they overlap in their treatment of unem-
ployment, and so henceforth we will treat them as the same.
1. Industry-Level Analysis
For the most part, agencies have complied with the mandate to
analyze employment by evaluating the effects of regulation on the
regulated industry, standing alone. For instance, a 2009 National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") regulation set-
ting Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") standards in-
cludes an analysis of the regulation's economic feasibility. 7 This
analysis describes the economic effects of regulation on the auto-
mobile industry as a whole; the agency understands its statutory
mandate as determining whether regulation is "within the financial
capability of the [automobile] industry, but not so stringent as to
threaten substantial economic hardship for the industry."'8 But af-
ter surveying the automobile industry in general terms, the agency
turns with greater specificity to the regulation's effect on employ-
ment.
The NHTSA's fuel economy standards force automobile manu-
facturers to develop and install more fuel-efficient engines or find
other ways of increasing automobile fuel efficiency. This regulation
has a number of potentially offsetting effects on employment. The
automotive firms will be forced to expend resources on research
and development, possibly including hiring more engineers and
scientists to develop more fuel-efficient engines. 9 The new tech-
nology might also change the number of workers needed on the
production line to install the engines and construct the automo-
biles." However, the agency raises these possibilities just to dismiss
7 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year
2011, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,377 (Mar. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523,
531, 533, 534, 536, 537) [hereinafter Average Fuel Economy].
" Id. (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256,
264 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
1 Id. at 14,378 ("[H]iring of additional engineers by automobile companies and their
suppliers to do research and development and testing on new technologies to deter-
mine their capabilities, durability, platform introduction, etc.").20Id.
[Vol. 98:579586
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them. It treats these two effects as if they will have zero impact,2'
believing that they will generally be ambiguous and small.
The major employment effect of the regulation lies elsewhere.
By requiring new technology, the NHTSA's regulation will raise
the cost of producing automobiles. At the same time, it will reduce
the cost of owning an automobile by reducing fuel expenses. The
increase in production costs is expected to substantially exceed the
decrease in operating costs. 22 The automobile manufacturers will
then have to decide whether to absorb these costs themselves (in
the form of lower profits or salaries) or pass them along to con-
sumers. If they pass even some of the costs along to consumers the
price of automobiles will rise. Consumers will then purchase fewer
automobiles, and firms will lay off excess workers who are no
longer needed in the production line.
The first step along this causal chain requires the NHTSA to cal-
culate the expected increase in the price of automobiles under the
regulation. First, the NHTSA assumed that automobile manufac-
turers would be able to pass the entire increased cost of building
more fuel-efficient automobiles along to consumers.23 Next, the
NHTSA calculated how much it would actually cost the manufac-
turer to build the more fuel-efficient cars. It performed this calcula-
tion independently for every major automobile manufacturer with
sales in the United States. It then translated this additional cost
into the additional price that a consumer must pay over the lifetime
of the automobile (which the agency assumed to be five years); to
the base price, the NHTSA added the cost of higher interest pay-
ments (for those consumers who lease the vehicle), higher sales
taxes, and higher insurance costs (it costs more to insure a more
expensive automobile), while subtracting the benefit of higher re-
sale value. 4 The NHTSA estimated that an average consumer
would pay 5.5% in sales tax, 5 8.0% of the vehicle's cost in insur-
2 Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evalua-
tion: Nat'l Ctr. for Statistics and Analysis, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2011 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, at VII-19
(2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.govJDOTINHTSARulemakingRulesl
Associated%20Files/CAFE-Final-RuleMY2011_FRIA.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA].
22 Id. at VII-15.
" Id. at VII-12.
24 Id. at VII-13 to -14.
22Id. at VII-13.
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ance premiums,26 and 9.5% in loan interest payments.27 The agency
also estimated that 27.7% of the car's resale value would remain
after five years.' The agency thus calculated that the consumer
would be able to recoup 4.7% (27.7-9.5-8.0-5.5=4.7) of the added
regulatory cost of the automobile.29 The consumer would, in effect,
"only" be paying for 95.3% of the additional cost of complying
with the NHTSA's regulations.
The agency then subtracted the reduced cost of operating the au-
tomobile that would result from lower fuel costs. 3° The resulting
figure was the effective automobile cost increase under the regula-
tion."
Next, the NHTSA determined the effect that price increases will
have on consumer demand-in other words, the price elasticity of
demand for automobiles. According to the agency, economic stud-
ies have demonstrated that price elasticity in the demand for
automobiles is -1.0, which means that every 1% increase in the cost
of automobiles decreases the number of automobiles purchased by
1%.32 Accordingly, the NHTSA calculated the expected price in-
crease in automobiles as a percentage of current costs, which yields
the expected percentage drop in consumer demand. The NHTSA
then translated that percentage decrease in demand into absolute
numbers of automobile sales that would not occur as a result of its
regulation. The NHTSA provided an example of this calculation as
applied to the Ford Motor Company:
'
6 Id.
2 Id. at VII-13 to -14. Interest payments are actually higher, but the NHTSA dis-
counted them by 30% because 30% of consumers do not take out car loans.
Id. at VII-14.
Id. The figures reported in the text correspond to a discount rate of 7%. The
NHTSA also performed a similar calculation at a discount rate of 3% and estimated
that a consumer would recoup 8.2% of the additional value of the vehicle. Id.
30 Id. at VII-15.
" Average Fuel Economy, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,378 (Mar. 30, 2009) (to be codi-
fied at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534, 536, 537).32NHTSA, supra note 21, at VII-12 (citing Robert Bordley, An Overlapping Choice
Set Model of Automotive Price Elasticities, 28 Transp. Res. Pt. B 401, 401-08 (1994);
Andrew N. Kleit, The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Stan-
dards, 2 J. Reg. Econ. 151, 151-72 (1990); Patrick S. McCarthy, Market Price and In-
come Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands, 77 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 543, 543-47
(1996)).
588 [Vol. 98:579
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A sample calculation for Ford passenger cars under the Opti-
mized 7% alternative in MY 2011 is an estimated retail price in-
crease of $119 which is multiplied by 0.953 to get a residual price
increase of $113. The estimated fuel savings over the 5 years of
$176 at a 7 percent discount rate results in a net benefit to con-
sumers of $63. Comparing that to the $25,373 average price is a
0.247 percent price decrease. Ford sales were estimated to be
about 1,615,000 passenger cars for MY 2011. With a price elastic-
ity of -1.0, a 0.247 percent decrease in net cost to consumers
could result in an estimated increase in sales of 3,997 passenger
33
cars.
Though this projection seems quite rosy, the NHTSA immediately
noted that "[o]ur projections indicate that CAFE standards will re-
sult in sales increases for some manufacturers under some scenar-
ios, but overwhelmingly decreases for the industry total."
' '
In total, the NHTSA estimated that heightened CAFE standards
would lead to a decline in sales of 10,757 automobiles. 5 The agency
then calculated that "the average U.S. domestic employee [in the
Motor Vehicle and Equipment Manufacturing sector] produces
10.5 vehicles." 6 Dividing 10,757 by 10.5, the NHTSA arrived at an
estimate of 1,024 lost jobs.3'
The preceding discussion concerns the regulation that the
NHTSA eventually adopted, based on a cost-benefit analysis that
did not include the costs of unemployment. However, the NHTSA
actually considered six different regulatory options of increasing
stringency. We reproduce here the agency's table of estimated job
losses under these six options:
33 Id. at VII-15.
Id.
Id. at VII-17 tbl.VII-6.
Id. at VII-19.
Average Fuel Economy, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,378, 14,379 tbl.VII-1 (Mar. 30,
2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534, 536, 537); NHTSA, supra
note 21, at VII-19.
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Table 1: NHTSA Estimates of CAFE Standard Regulation on
Automobile Industry Employment for 201138
Regulatory Reduction in Net Effect on
Option Automobile Sales Employment
Option 1 -7,496 -714
Option 2 -10,757 -1,024
Option 3 -32,329 -3,079
Option 4 -48,704 -4,638
Option 5 -86,434 -8,232
Option 6 -585,272 -55,740
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the agency selected
Option 2, a level of regulation that would result in the loss of 1,024
jobs in 2011. It chose to regulate at this level because doing so max-
imized net social benefits-total benefits minus total costs-which
the NHTSA had calculated without regard to the costs of unem-
ployment.39 The NHTSA did not explain why it believed that the
loss of 1,024 jobs would not impose undue hardship on the auto-
mobile industry. Option 6 was the only option the NHTSA explic-
itly ruled out on the ground that it would result in too many lost
jobs.4' This may well be a defensible position, but the NHTSA pro-
vided no explanation for that conclusion either. Indeed, this per-
ception may be entirely an artifact of the regulatory options the
NHTSA considered. Fifty-five thousand lost jobs seems like quite a
lot when compared with the 1,024 jobs lost under Option 2, but it
may actually be only a relatively small portion of the automotive
industry or a small portion of the jobs lost during the automotive
bankruptcies. The NHTSA's economic feasibility analysis did not
attempt to justify its conclusion.4'
The best interpretation of the agency's approach is that it used
cost-benefit analysis subject to a feasibility constraint. Option 2
was the best rule on cost-benefit terms: because the job loss was
3 NHTSA, supra note 21, at VII-17 tbl.VII-6, VII-21 tbl.VII-8. Again, we report
only the calculations done with a 7% discount rate.
Average Fuel Economy, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,396.
See id. at 14,378, 14,379 tbl.VII-1, 14,395, 14,441.
41 Id. at 14,396 ("The standards thus fulfill NEPA's objectives and, under EPCA, the
need of the nation to conserve energy, while not imposing substantial economic hard-
ship on the industry. ").
590 [Vol. 98:579
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not too great, it was acceptable. If, by contrast, Option 2 had en-
tailed a job loss of 55,000 it would have been rejected in favor of
Option 1 or some other less stringent rule. However, because the
agency does not provide a standard for determining economic fea-
sibility-how much job loss is too much-the constraint is mean-
ingless or at best ad hoc. It is arbitrary to assert that 55,000 lost
jobs is too much while 8,000 lost jobs is tolerable, and one could
imagine many other approaches that are no less arbitrary: for ex-
ample, looking at job loss as a percentage rather than an absolute
number, or looking at the percentage of job loss in particular
communities. In any event, one needs a rule to determine the tol-
erable level of job loss.
Moreover, all lost jobs are not equivalent. A significant unem-
ployment figure (for example, 55,000 jobs lost) could have only a
minor effect if all of the workers are quickly rehired by another
firm or in another industry. Conversely, significantly fewer num-
bers of lost jobs could be very harmful if they are concentrated in a
one-factory town or if the affected workers have no other skills and
few prospects for future employment. One should care not only
about the quantity of the jobs lost, but the actual impact on peo-
ple's well-being, including their ability to obtain replacement jobs
and the quality and pay of those replacement jobs.
Finally, the number of lost jobs that an agency is willing to toler-
ate should depend on the extent of the benefits from regulating.
Fifty-five thousand lost jobs might be tolerable for a regulation
with truly sweeping effect but intolerable in the course of a much
more minor regulation. If agencies incorporated unemployment
into cost-benefit analysis, this type of comparison would be possi-
ble. But the NHTSA, like other agencies, calculated the costs and
benefits of regulation without any reference to unemployment-
related costs. The agency's "Economic Impact Analysis" was
merely a check on the practicability of the regulatory option the
agency had already chosen on other grounds-and a standardless
check at that. The result is that unemployment is treated almost as
if it were incommensurable with other goods such as consumer
welfare or environmental protection, despite the fact that con-
sumer welfare and environmental protection are themselves
treated as commensurable, as are nearly all other costs and benefits
of regulation.
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The NHTSA's fuel economy regulation is just one of the many
regulations that take employment into account in this sideways
fashion. The EPA engages in a similar analysis across a wide vari-
ety of regulations, though its approach differs in important re-
spects. Consider, for instance, the EPA's 2011 regulation of air-
borne emissions from boilers and process heaters. 2 Like the
NHTSA, the EPA decomposed the employment effects of its regu-
lation into three components.43 First, higher production costs
caused by regulation increase prices, reducing demand for the reg-
ulated product and thus for labor in the regulated industry. The
second and third effects point in the other direction: as production
costs increase, it takes more labor to create the same level of out-
put, and regulation may change the technology used in production
in a way that makes production more or less labor intensive. For
instance, polluters might comply with regulation by using automa-
tion or by hiring additional workers.'
These are the same effects described by the NHTSA in its fuel
economy regulation. But whereas the NHTSA selected the domi-
nant effect (increased production costs) and attempted to calculate
it directly, the EPA instead relied on an academic study of em-
ployment and environmental regulation that attempts to capture
these three effects simultaneously. This paper, by Morgenstern,
Pizer, and Shih ("MPS"), 5 uses a structural model to estimate the
effects of environmental regulation on employment across "four
heavily polluting industries": pulp and paper, plastics, petroleum
refining, and steel. 6 MPS find that environmental regulations actu-
ally create jobs in the net at a (statistically insignificant) rate of 1.55
new jobs per $1 million in cost increases. 7
The EPA applied the MPS study directly to its boiler regulation.
The EPA estimated that the regulation would create approxi-
mately $2.4 billion in compliance costs. 8 MPS measured costs in
42National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: In-
dustrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 76 Fed. Reg.
15,608 (Mar. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
" EPA, supra note 3, at 4-9.
"Id.
45 Morgenstern et al., supra note 12.
46 Id. at 412.471 Id. at 427-28.
"EPA, supra note 3, at 4-10 n.6.
[Vol. 98:579592
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1987 dollars, while the EPA's boiler regulation was priced in 2009
dollars, so the EPA applied a .6 multiplier in order to discount the
regulatory costs to their 1987 value.49 Accordingly, the EPA con-
cluded that its boiler regulation would create approximately 2,200
new jobs."
The obvious problem with the EPA's analysis-one explicitly
acknowledged by the agency-is that even if the MPS calculations
are correct, what is true in the pulp and paper, plastics, petroleum,
and steel industries may not hold true with regard to boilers and
process heaters." There is no reason to believe that employment in
the boiler industry will be affected by regulation in the same way
that those four industries were-in part because those industries
were themselves affected differently. MPS found that each $1 mil-
lion in additional regulatory costs would create 6.90 jobs in plas-
tics, 2 2.17 jobs in petroleum, and 0.53 jobs in steel, but would
eliminate 1.13 jobs in pulp and paper manufacturing.3 Without
knowing where the boiler and process heater industry falls along
this spectrum, we cannot estimate the true effect that regulation
will have upon employment in that industry. The EPA also ignored
studies that, contrary to MPS's, find negative employment effects
of environmental regulations for other industries.' The EPA used
the MPS study in other regulations, though occasionally it mixed it
with other numerical approaches.5 It is hard to avoid the inference
4 Id. at 4-10 n.5.
5 Id. at 4-10. The actual calculation was $2.4 billion x .6 x 1.55 jobs / $1 million =
2,200 jobs. See id. at 4-10 n.6.
"Id. at 4-12.
52This is not entirely surprising, as the conventional wisdom has long been that plas-
tics is a growth industry. See, e.g., Internet Movie Database, Memorable Quotes for
The Graduate, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0061722/quotes (last visited Nov. 29, 2011)
("Mr. McGuire: I just want to say one word to you. Just one word.. .
53 Morgenstern et al., supra note 12, at 427 tbl.III.
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 12.
"EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources and Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Commercial and Industrial
Solid Waste Incineration Units, at 3-10 tbl.3-5 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdatalRlAs/CISWIRIAfinalllO221psg2.pdf (estimat-
ing 300 jobs gained using only Morgenstern et al.'s methodology); EPA, Regulatory
Impact Analysis: Amendments to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants and New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for the Portland Cement
Manufacturing Industry, at 3-17 (2010), available at http://www.notoxicair.org/
doc/EPARIAanalysis-amendment-cement.pdf (estimating 807 jobs lost using
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that the EPA used MPS's irrelevant study, rather than other irrele-
vant studies that find negative effects, because MPS's results al-
lowed the EPA to ignore the possible negative employment effects
of its regulations.
Another example is the EPA's 1998 regulation of pulp and pa-
per mills under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.56 In parallel
with the NHTSA's CAFE standards, the EPA calculated the costs
and benefits of regulating without regard to the effects of regula-
tion on employment. Separately from this cost-benefit analysis, the
EPA conducted what it described as an "economic impact" analy-
sis of the regulation's likely effects including a consideration of un-
employment." This regulation predated the MPS study, so the
EPA instead performed what it describes as a "closure analysis.""8
Using methodology similar to the NHTSA's, it estimated the num-
ber of plants that would be forced to close and the number of firms
that might be bankrupted as a result of regulation, and it calculated
the number of jobs that would be lost as a result of these closures. 9
The EPA considered two regulatory options. It found that the
first option would likely result in the loss of 5,711 jobs due to rising
costs of production and the second in the loss of 9,887.' It then
mixed methodologies). Sometimes, however, the EPA does not use MPS at all, and
for no apparent reason. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for
the Construction and Development Point Source Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,996,
63,029-36 (Dec. 1, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450) (using an analysis of em-
ployment that resembles the NHTSA's).
6National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category:
Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards,
and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63
Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,578-87 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261,
430) [hereinafter National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Category].
17 EPA, Economic Analysis for the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp,
Paper, and Paperboard Category-Phase 1, at 1-3 (1997), available at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/pulppaper/upload/1997-11_13_guide
pulppaperjd pulp.pdf.
-Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3-4, 6-1.
60 Id. at 6-34 tbl.6-14. The EPA actually considered a third option but did not calcu-
late the job loss that would result from it, so we disregard it here. See id. It is possible
that the EPA did not bother to calculate the job loss for the third option because it
would have been prohibitively great. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous
[Vol. 98:579594
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concluded on the basis of these figures that the first option was
"economically achievable," while the second was not.6' Just as with
the NHTSA's fuel economy regulations, the agency did not justify
its conclusion that a regulation resulting in 5,711 lost jobs was tol-
erable while greater numbers of lost jobs would not be.62 Nor did it
attempt to compare the costs of these lost jobs to the benefits of
the regulation.
For the EPA, like the NHTSA, unemployment effectively func-
tions as a regulatory veto point. If the chosen level of regulation
will result in too much unemployment, it is unacceptable. Other-
wise, the agency may proceed. Again the threshold between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable unemployment is not articulated, and so
it is impossible to evaluate the EPA's choices. It may be no acci-
dent that both the NHTSA and the EPA eventually chose among
the least stringent regulatory options. These options might have
appeared most palatable to the agency in comparison to the alter-
natives. Or the agency might have considered a much wider variety
of possibilities but only listed these regulatory options (and not
other, less stringent ones) in order to make the agency's choice ap-
pear all the more reasonable. It is impossible to evaluate the
agency's decision with no point of reference.
2. Economy-Wide Treatment of Unemployment
The unemployment calculations we described in the preceding
Subsection were industry-specific. In the course of regulating a sin-
gle industry, an agency calculated the anticipated effects of regula-
Air Pollutants for Source Category, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,584 (indicating that the jobs
lost under this third option for mill closures alone would have been significantly
greater than under either of the first two options).
61 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category,
63 Fed. Reg. at 18,584. However, the second option was chosen for new sources. See
id. at 18,506.
6 It is actually not clear whether the EPA based this conclusion on the total number
of jobs that would be lost throughout the economy from the regulation, which we re-
port in the text, or purely on the number of lost jobs that would result from mills clos-
ing as a direct result of the regulation. See id. at 18,584. It would be indefensible for
the EPA to decide on the appropriate level of regulation based upon only the "direct"
impacts, which exclude the regulation's effects on suppliers and other affiliated indus-
tries.
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tion on employment in that industry. This is the most common
mode of analysis across agencies.
6
However, rather than follow this industry-specific methodology,
at least one agency instead typically analyzes the effects of regula-
tion on employment in the economy as a whole.4 Over the past
several years, the Department of Energy ("DOE") has promul-
gated a suite of energy efficiency regulations, each of which man-
dates an efficiency standard for some type of machinery or con-
sumer device. Light bulbs and small electric motors were recent
subjects of regulation.65 Instead of examining the effect of regula-
tion on demand and production in the regulated industry, the DOE
offered a broad analysis of the effect of energy efficiency on the
economy as a whole. Its reasoning is identical across all energy ef-
ficiency regulations: the primary effect of mandating greater en-
ergy efficiency is to decrease the amount of money consumers must
spend on energy, freeing them to spend that additional wealth on
some other activity.' The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports statis-
tics on the number of jobs created per dollar of economic activity
in various industries, and the DOE observes that the utility (elec-
tricity-generating) sector produces fewer jobs per dollar than most
(but not all) other economic sectors." Based on this observation,
the DOE concluded that mandating greater energy efficiency in
any product at any time will lead to increases in employment as
consumers "shift economic activity from a less labor-intensive sec-
63 See, e.g., Average Fuel Economy, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,378 (Mar. 30, 2009) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534, 536, 537); National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry and
Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970, 55,025
(Sept. 9,2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
64The Department of Energy is the only agency we have identified that employs the
methodology we describe below, but it is always possible that there are others.
6"See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small
Electric Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874 (Mar. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.
431); Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Proce-
dures for General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74
Fed. Reg. 34,080 (July 14, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
6See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
Small Electric Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,907.67 Id.
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tor (i.e., the utility sector) to more labor-intensive sectors (e.g., the
retail and manufacturing sectors)."
This analysis is rife with problems. First, although the DOE may
be correct that consumers will shift dollars previously spent on
electricity toward more labor-intensive sectors of the economy, it
has not considered the effects of regulation on the product being
regulated. Sales of small electric motors will likely decline if they
become more expensive due to regulation, and this may result in
lost jobs. Or if sales do not decline, higher costs might force con-
sumers to reduce spending in other economic areas, costing jobs
elsewhere. Second, even if the DOE is correct that consumers will
have more money to spend in other economic sectors, it cannot
know exactly where that money will go. The money may be spent
in an industry even less labor-intensive than power generation.
Consumers may also save the money, which will normally depress
employment in the short term. The agency is engaging in a kind of
surreptitious industrial policy, funneling money to industries that
will supposedly generate more jobs and away from industries that
generate few jobs.
B. A Cross-Sectional Snapshot
We offer here a representative snapshot of agency regulations
and their unemployment analyses. The table below lists thirteen
recent regulations. For each regulation we report the job loss pre-
dicted by the agency and the agency's statement regarding why the
unemployment would not render the regulation infeasible. In none
of these regulations-and in no regulation we could find-did the
agency compute the costs of unemployment and weigh them
against the benefits.69
' Id. at 10,908; see also, e.g., Energy Conservation Standards for General Service
Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,920, 16,978
(proposed Apr. 13, 2009). The second cited regulation is a Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, but in its final rule the DOE adopted the employment analysis wholesale.
Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures
for General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 34,130.
69There is one quasi-exception. The Department of Agriculture's Roadless Area
Conservation regulation describes unemployment as a "cost" but it does not monetize
that cost, and its cost-benefit analysis does not take into account unemployment ef-
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Table 2: Selected Regulatory Actions Involving Unemployment
Calculations
Regulation Agency Citation Estimated Explanation Net
Job Loss Benefits
Protection Dep't of 59 Fed. "no more Estimated that Unquanti-
of the Mo- the Inte- Reg. 5820 than 425 over 85% of un- fied
jave habitat rior: Fish (Feb. 4, jobs"70  employed work-
of the de- and Wild- 1994) ers would find
sert tortoise life Ser- new jobs within 2
71
vice years _
Effluent EPA 63 Fed. 5,7117 Argued that only $159.5 mil-
guidelines Reg. 1% of jobs in the lion 7
for pulp 18,504 industry would
and paper (Apr. 15, be lost
74
manufac- 1998)
turing
Effluent EPA 65 Fed. 69-109 None, with an Partially
guidelines Reg. 3008 with +79 admission that quantified:
for landfills (Jan. 19, offsetting76  job gains and only mone-
2000) losses may not tized re-
occur in the same duced car-
communities77  cinogenic
risk, which
totals
$2,100-
$11,000 per
year
fects. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3267 (Jan. 12,
2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
70 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Determination of Critical Habi-
tat for the Mojave Population of the Desert Tortoise, 59 Fed. Reg. 5820, 5831 (Feb. 8,
1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 5832.7
' EPA, supra note 57, at 6-34 tbl.6-14.74 Id.
7 EPA, supra note 57, at 10-4 tbl.10-2. This figure was calculated using the median
expected net total benefits at a 3% discount rate. See also infra Table 5.
6 Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Per-
formance Standards for the Landfills Point Source Category, 65 Fed. Reg. 3008, 3029
(Jan. 19, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136, 445).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 3031.
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Regulation Agency Citation Estimated Explanation Net
Job Loss Benefits
Emissions EPA 65 Fed. 94 None Unquanti-
standards Reg. fled: EPA
for alumi- 15,690 estimates
num pro- (Mar. 23, that im-
duction 2000) plementa-
tion of the
NESHAP
will reduce
all pollut-
ants by
14,200 Mg
per year
(15,600
tpy) s°
Conserva- Dep't of 66 Fed. 4,014- Refused to quan- Un uanti-
tion of Agricul- Reg. 3244 4,5492 tify any costs or fled
roadless ture: For- (Jan. 12, benefits
3
forest land est Ser- 2001)"1
vice
Effluent EPA 67 Fed. 24-29 per Job losses might $13 mil-
standards Reg. 3370 year be offset by job lion"'
for coal (Jan. 23, gains in regions
mines 2002) with "cleaner"
coal_ _
7 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Secondary Alumi-
num Production, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,690, 15,705 (Mar. 23, 2000) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63).
Id. at 15,704.
8, This regulation was amended following litigation, but the calculations for job loss
were unchanged. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the
Tongass National Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
82 This figure was calculated by adding lost jobs across three economic sectors. The
range of expected job losses accounts for some uncertainty in the calculation. Special
Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3268 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
83 Id. at 3267.
84Id.
85EPA, Economic and Environmental Impact Assessment of Proposed Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Coal Mining Industry: Remining and
Western Alkaline Subcategories, at 6-3 (2000), available at http:/Iwater.epa.gov/
scitech/wastetech/guide/coal/upload/2000_04_12_guide-coal-impact.pdf.
'6 Id.
Coal Mining Point Source Category; Amendments to Effluent Limitations Guide-
lines and New Source Performance Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 3370, 3396 (Jan. 23, 2002)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 434).
HeinOnline  -- 98 Va. L. Rev. 599 2012
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:579
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat
for Astragulus magdalennae var. peirsonii (Peirson's milk-vetch), 69 Fed. Reg. 47,330,
47,344 (Aug. 4, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
89 Id. at 47,345.
Id. at 47,344.
91 Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,378, 14,379 tbl.VII-1
(Mar. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534, 536, 537).
Id. at 14,377.
" Id. at 14,386 tbl.VII-6.
9 This is the date of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which considered unem-
ployment specifically. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards
for Small Electric Motors, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,410, 61,469, 61,475 (proposed Nov. 24,
2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431). The final rule, published on March 9, 2010,
adopts the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking's Employment Analysis in its entirety.
Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,908 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431).
Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 74 Fed. Reg. at 61,475.
9' Id. at 61,446.
Id. at 61,482 tbI.V.43.
600
Regulation Agency Citation Estimated Explanation Net
Job Loss Benefits
Designation Dep't of 69 Fed. 1,207- Believed that job "[V]irtually
of pro- the Inte- Reg. 2,585" loss was too se- no addi-
tected habi- rior: Fish 47,330 vere and refused tional Fed-
tat for the and Wild- (Aug. 4, to protect the eral regula-
Astragalus life 2004) habitatp tory
magdalenae benefits" '
Average NHTSA 74 Fed. 1,024" Claimed that $802 mil-
Fuel Econ- Reg. there was no sub- lion93
omy Stan- 14,196 stantial hardship
dards Pas- (Mar. 30, on the industry
senger Cars 2009)
and Light
Trucks,
Model Year
2011
Energy Dep't of 74 Fed. 0 (likely Believed that $1.73 bil-
conserva- Energy Reg. jobs capital would lion97
tion stan- 61,410 gained)95  shift to more la-
dards for (proposed bor-intensive in-
small elec- Nov. 24, dustries, creating
tric motors 2009) 9' jobs 96
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Regulation Agency Citation Estimated Explanation Net
Job Loss Benefits
Effluent EPA 74 Fed. 7,257w No explicit justi- Net bene-
guidelines Reg. fication fits: (nega-
for the con- 62,996 tive) $584
struction (Dec. 1, million per
and devel- 2009) year
opment in-
dustries
Emissions EPA 75 Fed. 807 '0o  No explicit justi- $6.5-$17
standards Reg. fication billion'°
for air pol- 54,970
lutants (Sept. 9,
from the 2010)
Portland
cement
manufac-
turing in-
dustry
Emissions EPA 76 Fed. 2,200 jobs Believed that en- $20.5-$52.5
standards Reg. gained'02  vironmental billion'
for boilers 15,608 regulation cre-
and process (Mar. 21, ates jobs
103
heaters 2011)
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Devel-
opment Point Source Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,996, 63,023 (Dec. 1, 2009) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450).
" Id. at 62,997-98.
"0 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Portland
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement
Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970, 55,025 (Sept. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60,
63). The Agency performed this estimation using a variety of methodologies and
ended up with a range of predictions from 1,500 jobs lost to 1,300 jobs gained. The 807
jobs lost figure represents the Agency's best guess.
01 Id. at 55,028. These are the net benefits at a 3% discount rate. The net benefits at
a 7% discount rate are $5.8 to $16 billion. These figures are reported in 2005 dollars.
'02 EPA, supra note 3, at 4-10.
103 Id.
"'
4 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources:
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 76 Fed. Reg.
15,608, 15,611 (Mar. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). These are the net
benefits at a 3% discount rate. At a 7% discount rate, the benefits are $18.5 to $47.5
billion. These figures are reported in 2008 dollars.
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Regulation Agency Citation Estimated Explanation Net
Job Loss Benefits
Emissions EPA 76 Fed. 300 jobs Characterized $130-$770
standards Reg. gained.5  the number of million" 7
for com- 15,704 lost jobs as
mercial and (Mar. 21, "small"' 6
industrial 2011)
solid waste
incineration
As this table indicates, agencies routinely address the employ-
ment effects of regulations. Expected job losses also vary widely,
from mere dozens as a result of some regulations to thousands in
others. We were able to find only one regulation in which the
agency believed that job loss would be so severe that regulation of
any type was inappropriate. (There were others in which unem-
ployment ruled out some regulatory options and counseled in favor
of more modest regulation.) That was the Department of the Inte-
rior's proposed 2004 regulation regarding protection of the Astra-
galus magdalenae, a type of plant native to California. There, the
Department of the Interior ("DOI") concluded that expected job
losses of 1,207 to 2,585 were too great, and because it did not be-
lieve that there was any workable intermediate option it elected
not to regulate the habitat at all."° We suspect that in other cases
agencies simply do not propose regulations in the first place when
the expected unemployment effects are too large.
As is obvious from the table above, many agencies have elected
to regulate even when doing so would mean many more lost jobs
than the DOI expected. The unexplained variation in regulatory
05 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources and Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Commercial and Industrial
Solid Waste Incineration Units, at 3-10 tbl.3-5 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/CISWIRIAfinall10221-psg2.pdf.
1Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines
for Existing Sources: Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units, 76
Fed. Reg. 15,704, 15,744 (Mar. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60).
Id. at 15,713 tbl.3. These are the net benefits at a 3% discount rate. The net bene-
fits at a 7% discount rate are $90 to $660 million. These figures are reported in 2008
dollars.
108 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat
for Astragulus magdalennae var. peirsonii (Peirson's milk-vetch), 69 Fed. Reg. 47,330,
47,344 (Aug. 4, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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outcomes underscores the arbitrariness of agency decisionmaking
under current procedures. Without a standard by which to gauge
how much unemployment is too much, agency decisions will be in-
consistent and impossible to evaluate. It is possible that agencies
are actually engaging in sub silentio cost-benefit analysis with un-
employment figures included. For instance, agencies might believe
that a few thousand lost jobs are acceptable when it comes to regu-
lating fuel economy standards or effluents from the construction
industry, but they are intolerable in the context of a regulation of a
plant's habitat. If this is in fact taking place, it might be intelligent
policy. But if agencies engage in this type of analysis, they should
do so systematically and transparently, not on an ad hoc basis. In
the Part that follows, we take up the case for including unemploy-
ment in cost-benefit analysis.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis, as the name suggests, involves the com-
parison of the costs and benefits of regulations. The overall proce-
dure is straightforward, although the details can be tricky. Consider
a proposed regulation to limit the use of certain chemicals in the
production process of paper mills. Paper mills must replace those
chemicals with more expensive chemicals. Let us say that the extra
cost is $100. The firm will attempt to pass on that cost to consumers
in the form of higher prices. Depending on the shape of the de-
mand curve for paper, the consumers will pay a large or small pro-
portion of the cost. As a consequence, consumer surplus-the dif-
ference between how much consumers would be willing to pay for
paper and how much they actually pay-declines. Some consumers
will be priced out of the market and their consumer surplus will be
reduced to zero. If the firm cannot pass on the full cost to consum-
ers, the shareholders will incur some of the cost, otherwise known
as a reduction in producer's surplus. The change in the sum of the
consumer's and producer's surpluses is the cost of the regulation.
' For defenses of cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g., Mathew D. Adler & Eric A. Pos-
ner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006); Kenneth J. Arrow et al.,
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation (1996), avail-
able at http://ideas.repec.orglp/reglwpaper/615.html; Richard L. Revesz & Michael A.
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The benefit of the regulation will be felt in the form of improved
environmental quality: air and water will be cleaner. These benefits
can be monetized in various ways. For example, if the pollution
that is to be eliminated makes people ill, then medical costs are
saved. If bad smells are eliminated, then these benefits are
monetized as the amount that people are willing to pay to elimi-
nate the smells. Benefits enjoyed over the future must be reduced
to present value by multiplying them by a discount factor. If the
benefits exceed the costs, then the proposed regulation passes the
cost-benefit analysis.
We have not said anything so far about the effects of the regula-
tion on workers. But if the firms must raise prices, then demand
will fall, in which case the firms will produce less paper. With less
production, firms will normally need less labor. They will lay off
workers who may not have jobs for a period of time. As we noted
in the Introduction, economists usually ignore the costs to workers.
To understand why, and to understand the problems with ignoring
costs to workers, we must discuss the labor market and unemploy-
ment. We will do so after we examine why unemployment should
be regarded as a cost in the first place.
B. Is Unemployment a Cost?
Unemployment is a cost only if it makes people worse off. It
might seem that unemployment is straightforwardly a harm, but
the truth is more complex."' Many people do not want to work and
stop working when they get the chance: they retire having accumu-
lated sufficient savings; they quit after marrying a spouse who will
support them; they never work in the first place, instead living off
an inheritance or adopting a bohemian lifestyle. For many people
(possibly most), work is a means to an end-the acquisition of
money to finance consumption-and is not a good in itself. Thus,
for these people, unemployment is not a cost in itself; rather, it de-
prives them of the ability to earn money. If c is the cost of working
Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the
Environment and Our Health (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The
Future of Regulatory Protection (2002); Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of
Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1021 (2004).
There is a small philosophical literature on the nature of work; recent essays are
compiled in Philosophy and the Problems of Work (Kory Schaff ed., 2001).
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and w is the wage, then the loss from unemployment is simply w-c.
They would be just as happy with a transfer from the state of w-c as
they would be with a regulation that prevents them from becoming
unemployed in the first place.
For other people, work has intrinsic value such that they receive
w-c+n, where n refers to pleasure in the work, status, or dignity
from the work, and other forms of nonpecuniary compensation
from the work. Even these people may not be significantly harmed
from unemployment if they can obtain the nonpecuniary benefits
from employment through volunteer work. Then the loss is simply
w-c, as in the first case. Other people, however, may not be able to
obtain all the nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work that they
enjoyed from their job, and of course comparable volunteer work
may not be available.
Indeed, a substantial literature indicates that the negative psy-
chological effects of (long-term) unemployment are considerable.
Many unemployed people suffer because of the loss of a structured
schedule, contacts with other people, and status.' Their unem-
.' See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in Brit-
ain and the USA, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1359, 1373 (2004) (finding similar results for Great
Britain and the United States that to compensate men exactly for unemployment
would take a rise in income of approximately $60,000 per year); Andrew E. Clark &
Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness and Unemployment, 104 Econ. J. 648, 650-51 (1994)
(showing that unemployment is associated with significantly lower self-reported men-
tal well-being scores); William T. Gallo et at., The Persistence of Depressive Symp-
toms in Older Workers Who Experience Involuntary Job Loss: Results from the
Health and Retirement Survey, 61 J. Gerontol. B. Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. S221, S221
(2006) (showing that older, lower net-worth workers who lose their jobs are more
likely to suffer from depression than those who do not); Knut Gerlach & Gesine
Stephan, A Paper on Unhappiness and Unemployment in Germany, 52 Econ. Letters
325, 325 (1996) (showing that unemployment reduces life satisfaction beyond what
would be expected from the loss of labor income); Marie Jahoda, Economic Reces-
sion and Mental Health: Some Conceptual Issues, 44 J. Soc. Issues, no. 4, 1988, at 13,
13 (finding that the greatest burden of economic recession falls on the unemployed,
and noting that the large majority of the unemployed are psychologically impaired);
Marie Jahoda, Work, Employment, and Unemployment: Values, Theories, and Ap-
proaches in Social Research, 36 Am. Psychol. 184, 188 (1981) (examining non-
pecuniary benefits of work including the external imposition of a time structure on
the working day, regularly shared experiences and contact with people outside of the
family, links to goals and purposes that transcend the individual, the definition of per-
sonal status and identity, and the enforcement of activity); Liliana Winkelmann &
Rainer Winkelmann, Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy? Evidence from Panel
Data, 65 Economica 1, 13 (1998) (showing that unemployment reduces life satisfac-
tion); Alan B. Krueger & Andreas Mueller, The Lot of the Unemployed: A Time Use
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ployment also affects other people, including their children, who
experience problems at school and in their relationships with oth-
ers; spouses, who experience higher levels of stress; and even co-
workers who remain employed, who suffer from lower levels of job
security and possible "survivors' guilt."...2 The only possibly offset-
ting effect is that those who are already unemployed feel less
stigma when others lose their jobs."3
There is a subtle question whether it is appropriate or even pos-
sible for government policy to address unemployment in the case
of people who obtain self-esteem from work. In a paper criticizing
the idea of a right to work, Professor Jon Elster points out that if
people obtain self-esteem from doing work that is socially produc-
tive, then make-work programs sponsored by the government that
produce jobs that would not exist in the private sector will not in
fact give people the good that they care about."' Elster's argument
can be generalized as a criticism of any government program that
saves jobs. Consider, for example, a regulation that would be so-
cially beneficial but for its unemployment effects. If a polluting
plant that produces goods of marginal value is kept open simply to
maintain employment, then the workers in that plant will not de-
rive any self-esteem from their government-supported work. It
would be better to give them cash transfers. As Elster also notes,
however, workers' self-esteem appears to be robust against any
such program as long as the nature of the subsidy is partly dis-
guised." We suspect, then, that from the perspective of subjective
utility maximization, our case for opposing excessively strict regu-
lations that cause unemployment is not vulnerable to Elster's ob-
jection. Other normative premises might lead to different results.
Perspective 9 (Institute for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3490, 2008)
(showing that life satisfaction reports of the unemployed are significantly less than life
satisfaction reports of the employed).
11 Andrew Clark et al., Boon or Bane? Others' Unemployment Well-Being and Job
Insecurity, 17 Labour Econ. 52, 53-54 (2010) (examining the impact of aggregate un-
employment on workers' subjective well-being, and finding the strength of the re-
gional labor market to be a better predictor of a worker's well-being than the current
employment status of that worker).
"Id. at 54.
114 Jon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in Philosophy and
the Problems of Work, supra note 110, at 283, 294-95.
"' Id. at 295.
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When a person loses her job, she incurs a loss of w-c+n: she loses
her wage and the nonpecuniary benefits of the job but she gains
leisure. If she chooses to remain unemployed and devotes her free
time to consumption based on savings or other resources, then she
will continue to incur this loss on a per-period basis. Alternatively,
she could try to find a new job. Job-search costs are the costs of
sending out inquiries, interviewing, and so forth.116 Job-search costs
deprive the person of leisure that she would otherwise enjoy. If she
cannot find a comparable job through search, the person may un-
dergo retraining or move to another region where job opportuni-
ties are more plentiful. Both retraining and relocation may be ex-
pensive as well as time-consuming. Finally, when the person
obtains a new job, her new wage may be less than the old wage,
and the conditions and benefits of the job may be worse. All of
these costs in aggregate are the costs of unemployment for the pur-
pose of this Article.
Why might the new wages be less than the old wages? There are
two possible answers."7 The first is that the earlier wage reflected
the worker's (and firm's) substantial investment in the worker's
firm-specific human capital-or industry-specific human capital if
the worker's new position is outside the industry. Firm-specific
human capital consists of skills that a worker possesses which earn
returns only at the firm at which they were acquired. Understand-
ing of the culture and layout of a particular plant is a form of firm-
specific human capital. Industry-specific human capital consists of
skills that a worker possesses which earn returns only at a firm
within the industry in which those skills were acquired. Under-
standing how automobile assembly lines work is a form of industry-
specific human capital if this knowledge cannot be used in, say, the
116 See Alan B. Krueger & Andreas Mueller, Job Search and Unemployment Insur-
ance: New Evidence from Time Use Data, 94 J. Pub. Econ. 298, 299 (2010) (reporting
job search statistics).
1,7 See generally Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Comment, Do Displaced Workers Suffer
Losses of Specific Human Capital?, 33 Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Series on Pub. Pol'y
215 (1990); Robert Topel, Comment, Specific Capital and Unemployment: Measuring
the Costs and Consequences of Job Loss, 33 Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Series on Pub.
Pol'y 181 (1990). There are other possible explanations, but they seem less plausible
and general: for example, that the workers were paid efficiency wages by the first em-
ployer but not by the second employer because the second employer uses a different
monitoring technology that makes efficiency wages unnecessary.
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chemical industry or any other industry outside the automobile in-
dustry. When a plant is closed, the worker's plant-specific human
capital is destroyed. When an industry shrinks, so that workers
must search for jobs outside the industry, then those workers' in-
dustry-specific human capital is destroyed. And it is possible that
when a person does not work for a period of time, his or her skills
erode so that productivity and hence the wage will decline even if
that worker remains in the same industry."" The loss of this human
capital will be reflected in lower wages, which are thus appropri-
ately considered real social costs.
The second answer is that workers who lose their jobs earned
above-market wages. This is most likely to be true in industries
where the labor market is cartelized, which normally takes place
through unionization. For example, a worker who moves from a
unionized plant to a non-unionized plant will lose the wage pre-
mium associated with unionization. While this is a real loss for the
worker, it is not a social cost. The reason is that shareholders and
consumers will recover the loss in the form of higher profits or
lower prices. Transfers of this sort are not included in cost-benefit
analysis because they are not social costs. Empirical studies suggest
that both answers reflect part of the truth.119
C. The Labor Market and Unemployment
In the standard model of the labor market,2 ' employers hire
workers and pay them a wage that reflects the balance of supply
and demand. The supply curve reflects the willingness of workers
to supply labor in return for a wage. Workers are assumed to gain
utility from consumption and leisure. In order to consume, they
must work and earn a wage. Accordingly, the more they work the
more that they are able to consume. Thus, the supply curve slopes
upward: the higher the wage the more that a person will work, all
else equal. Any particular individual will experience diminishing
returns from work but employers will simply hire more people
"' See Per-Anders Edin & Magnus Gustavsson, Time Out of Work and Skill Depre-
ciation, 61 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163, 163 (2008) (finding that work interruptions
caused a decline in literacy).
'
9 See infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
See, e.g., George Borjas, Labor Economics (5th ed. 2010).
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when any particular individual runs out of hours in the day. The
supply curve should be understood as the aggregate supply of
work-hours from the relevant pool of workers.
Employers make profits using two inputs: capital and labor. As
the relative price of the two inputs changes, employers will substi-
tute one for the other. For example, if wages increase employers
will, at the margin, switch to capital (that is, buy machines) and
hire fewer people. Thus, the demand curve for labor slopes down-
ward: the higher the wage, the fewer the people whom firms will
employ, all else equal. Increased production costs will also reduce
demand for their product and, therefore, normally cause them to
hire fewer people.
Figure 1: The Labor Market
S
D
E*
In equilibrium, where the demand and supply curves intersect,
employers pay what economists call the market-clearing wage.121
All workers who are willing to work at that wage will receive a job
and be paid a wage, w*. Note that the employment level, E*, is
(obviously) not employment of all workers. Workers unwilling to
work for a wage less than or equal to w* will be unemployed. But
from an economic perspective, these unemployed workers are not
a social (or efficiency) problem: they are simply people who prefer
leisure to work at the price at which work is offered.
12 Id. at 148.
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From this standpoint, unemployment is a puzzle for economics.
Economics recommends government intervention in order to cor-
rect market failures and there is no market failure in the model
that we have described. However, the model reflects an idealized
unregulated market. We are interested in the real labor market,
which is affected by various frictions and by regulation.
A typical regulation will increase the cost of production for an
employer. For example, a regulation that requires scrubbers in
smokestacks will increase the cost of operating factories. The
owner must pass on the cost to consumers by raising the price of
the product. As a result of the higher price, demand for the prod-
uct will decline, and so the factory will manufacture fewer of the
products. With less production, fewer workers are needed and so
some are laid off.
22
On the graph, the demand curve shifts to the left, and in the new
equilibrium fewer workers are employed at level E' < E*. All the
workers who want to work at the new wage, w', will work at the
new wage."' Workers who were willing to work for no less than w*
(which is no longer offered) will no longer have jobs. In other
words, marginal workers will lose their jobs; inframarginal workers
will be paid the lower wage. In Figure 2, the loss is represented by
the areas between w' and w*, and between E' and E*. The aggre-
gate loss is caused by the regulation.
122 Regulations can increase employment as well: the regulated firm might be re-
quired to hire compliance workers; compliance with the regulation might require pur-
chasing goods from other industries which are labor-intensive; and consumers who
reduce consumption of goods produced by the regulated industry might switch to
goods produced by more labor-intensive industries. See Morgenstern et al., supra
note 12. These benefits should be taken into account as well, but we will ignore them
for the purpose of expository clarity. We will return to them in Section II.E, infra.
" However, wages are often thought to be "sticky." See Borjas, supra note 120, at
526. If the employer cannot reduce the wages of workers who are retained, then it will
lay off additional workers so that the employment level is in equilibrium given the old
(higher) wage and the shifted demand curve. In Figure 2, the new employment level is
E".
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Figure 2: Labor Market With Reduced Demand
S
I I D' D
E" E' E*
The actual magnitude of the effect of the regulation depends on
the structure of the various markets affected by the regulation.
Suppose, for example, that demand in the product market is inelas-
tic and supply in the labor market is elastic. This means that con-
sumers will not reduce consumption in response to higher prices,
while workers will quit in response to lower wages. The firm can-
not lower wages because if it does, workers will quit; and it has no
reason to. Because consumers will not reduce consumption in re-
sponse to higher prices, the firm will raise prices and, indeed, be
entirely unaffected by the regulation, as will its workers.
The assumption of inelastic consumer demand is unrealistic; the
important point is that elasticity is a matter of degree. If consumer
demand is perfectly elastic, the firm will simply go out of business.
If consumer demand is partially inelastic, then the firm will raise
prices but lose some customers. Because demand goes down, the
firm will reduce production. If the labor market is perfectly elastic,
the firm will fire workers but not reduce the wages of the remain-
ing workers. If the labor market is partially elastic, it will fire some
workers and reduce the wages of the remaining workers. A similar
point can be made about the elasticity of the capital market (which
is generally assumed to be high, so the firm can pass on costs to
shareholders only in the short term).
In a perfectly competitive labor market, workers would quit and
obtain new jobs at the prevailing wage. If workers' skills are indus-
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try specific, however, they will not be able to find comparable jobs
in other industries. They will need to retrain, and as we discussed
earlier, most workers must spend time and effort searching for a
new job, even if they stay in the same industry; among other things,
they may need to relocate. The aggregate loss from search and re-
training will depend on many factors-the industry specificity of
the worker's skills, local and national macroeconomic conditions,
and so forth. When industries die out, the cost of job loss will be
much greater; when the economy is booming, it will be less.
Summarizing, the cost of unemployment is (1) the lost wages
during the spell of unemployment minus leisure benefits; (2) any
search or retraining costs; and (3) any permanent reduction in
wages (due to loss of firm- or industry-specific capital), benefits,
and working conditions (including the intrinsic satisfaction of the
work) in subsequent employment. It is, of course, possible that the
worker enjoys no leisure benefits because he spends all his time in
job search or retraining. For the workers who leave the labor mar-
ket, the cost is the lost wages minus leisure benefits. For example, a
worker who is laid off at age 60 and decides to take early retire-
ment rather than search for a job or retrain will enjoy all the leisure
benefits of retirement, but these benefits will still be less than what
he would have enjoyed if he had continued to work (or otherwise
he would have retired voluntarily before being laid off).
There are possible additional social costs from unemployment. If
employed members of society feel sympathy for the unemployed,
and devote resources to helping them, then that is a social cost. Al-
ternative methods of helping the unemployed-such as unem-
ployment insurance-create well-known moral hazard problems:
people who receive unemployment insurance spend more time un-
employed.12" A cost-benefit analysis that takes account of the costs
of unemployment should take these costs into account; however,
" See Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, The Effects of the Unemployment
Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment, Claims and Denials, 78 J. Pub. Econ.
81, 102 (2000) (finding that unemployment insurance taxes on employers are largely
passed on to workers through lower wages); Kathleen P. Classen, The Effect of Un-
employment Insurance on the Duration of Unemployment and Subsequent Earnings,
30 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 438, 439-40 (1977) (finding that an increase in benefits
leads to an increase in the duration of unemployment). Other alternatives include job
training programs, make-work programs, and expansion of the money supply, all of
which are costly in different ways.
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for simplicity, we will ignore them henceforth and focus on wage
loss.
D. Measuring the Cost of Unemployment
The cost of unemployment can be high or low, depending on
numerous factors. Economists ignored these costs for a long time,
possibly because they assumed that workers quickly obtained re-
placement jobs at the same wage, but in the last ten years a sub-
stantial literature has emerged on the long-term (that is, aggregate)
earnings losses that result from job displacement.125 The literature
is large and complex, but we can use it to obtain a rough estimate
of the cost of unemployment for various types of worker, which
could be used in cost-benefit analysis of regulations that cause un-
employment.
1. Wage Effects
The most recent and comprehensive paper on what we will call
"wage effects"-the lost earnings of workers who are laid off-is
by von Wachter, Song, and Manchester ("VSM"). 26 The authors
focus on male, middle-aged workers who were stably employed in
the late 1970s. The workers are divided into three groups: those
who remained employed, those who lost their jobs in mass layoffs
(where employment at a firm declined by at least 30%), and those
who lost their jobs in non-mass layoffs. We will return to the sig-
nificance of these distinctions in Subsection 3.
The average worker earned approximately $50,000 (in year 2000
dollars) in 1979. Not surprisingly, the average wage declines dra-
matically for workers who are laid off. Those who lose their jobs
suffer an immediate wage loss of up to 33% (that is, some are re-
hired and obtain comparable or lower wages, while others are not).
What is surprising is that although these losses decline, they may
" The seminal work is Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Work-
ers, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 685 (1993), which resolved methodological problems that
hampered earlier work.
"6 Till von Wachter et al., Long-Term Earnings Losses due to Mass Layoffs During
the 1982 Recession: An Analysis Using U.S. Administrative Data from 1974 to 2004
(Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.columbia.edu/
-vw2112/papers/mass-layoffs_1982.pdf.
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remain as high as 21% to 27% twenty years after the job loss."'
VSM calculate that over twenty years the average loss for a worker
in their dataset ranges from $110,000 to $140,000."8 This range
must be considered a lower bound for the cost of unemployment
for an individual worker because losses most likely persist beyond
twenty years.
Other scholars have found similar results, although no other
study we are aware of examines earnings losses over twenty
years.129 Most studies go no further than six years. The studies find
first-year earnings losses from 17% to 66%, with most studies clus-
tering around 30% to 40%. The six-year studies find last-year earn-
ings losses ranging from 0% to 47%, with most around 10% to
20%.
These numbers are high, but it is possible that the actual harm is
somewhat less. First, to the extent that workers lose rents (the por-
tion of the wage that is above market), the loss is simply a trans-
fer-those rents will be captured by consumers or shareholders-
and not a social cost. For unionized workers, wage losses are more
likely to represent the loss of rents rather than the loss of human
capital, compared to non-unionized workers. This is because un-
ionized workers are more likely to be earning above-market wages.
Consistent with this theory, there is some evidence that wage losses
are higher for workers in heavily unionized industries than for
other workers, but the losses for non-unionized workers are still
substantial. ' Moreover, the workers in the VSM study are mostly
non-unionized workers and their wage losses are thus more likely
to represent true welfare losses."' Second, to the extent that firms
and workers anticipate layoffs and firms pay workers wage premi-
ums that compensate them for this risk, then the earnings decline
will be overstated. At least in recent years, however, unemploy-
127 Id. at 20.
'2 Id. at 16.
129A useful table with a literature survey can be found in Kenneth A. Couch &
Dana W. Placzek, Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers Revisited, 100 Am. Econ.
Rev. 572, 574 tbl.1 (2010).
3 See Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 703; Roger White, Long-run Wage and
Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 42 Applied Econ. 1845, 1855 (2010) (finding
that unionized workers lost $47,618 and non-unionized workers lost $32,439 over a
period beginning four years before displacement and five years after displacement).
131 von Wachter et al., supra note 126, at 4.
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ment insurance has partially displaced compensating differentials;
so while the distortion needs to be taken into account, there is rea-
son to believe that it is limited.
2. Nonpecuniary Effects
Workers who lose their jobs also incur a range of nonpecuniary
costs. We summarize a few of the major effects below.
Mortality. One study of high-seniority male workers in Pennsyl-
vania found that job loss was associated with a 50% to 100%
higher rate of mortality in the year of job loss, compared to work-
ers who were not laid off. This difference declined over time but
remained high, so that 20 years after job loss the mortality rate is
still 10% to 15% percent higher for those who lost their jobs than
for those who remained employed. A worker laid off at the age of
40 would lose 1 to 1.5 years of life expectancy compared to a
worker who was not laid off.' The authors attribute the higher
mortality to loss of earnings. VSM monetize this amount as
$100,000, which should be added to the pecuniary effects of unem-
ployment in order to calculate an overall cost of unemployment
per worker.'33
Homeownership and health insurance. A study of job loss in
California in the 1990s found that the rate of homeownership de-
clined for displaced workers by 4.1% to 8.3%, and the rate of
health insurance ownership declined by 4.5% to 9.15%.' The de-
cline in homeownership is probably derivative of the lost earnings
(people with less money are more likely to rent), but it is not likely
that changes in consumption are driving the effects on private in-
surance, as higher-paying jobs are also more likely to provide
132 Daniel Sullivan & Till von Wachter, Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analy-
sis Using Administrative Data, 124 Q.J. Econ. 1265, 1265 (2009).
133 Sullivan and von Wachter calculate this figure by dividing the 1.5 year loss of life
expectancy by the average U.S. life expectancy of 77.94 and multiplying by a $5 mil-
lion value of a statistical life, though most analysts use a figure of $6 million or higher.
Id. at 1290.
" Till von Wachter & Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, Variation in the Cost of Job
Loss by Worker Skill: Evidence Using Matched Data from California, 1991-2000, at
14-15 (Dec. 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.columbia.edu
-vw2112/papers/displskills vonwahandw30dec09.pdf.
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health insurance. Rather, the study concluded that "the loss in pri-
vate health insurance adds to the loss in long-term earnings."'35
Subjective well-being. A number of studies examine the effect of
various events on people's "subjective well-being," defined as the
score that they give themselves when asked how happy they are by
interviewers. These studies show that, for example, divorce and
widowhood make people less happy, while wealth (up to a point)
makes them more happy. The studies also uniformly show that un-
employment reduces people's happiness, even controlling for lost
earnings. One study monetized this loss at $60,000, which may re-
flect the loss in status and self-esteem and increased stress and anx-
iety that an unemployed person suffers independent of lost earn-
ings.'36 These effects persist to some degree even after the worker
has found another job.3 '
3. Variation
Demographics. The cost of unemployment varies according to
various characteristics of the worker, including age, sex, region of
employment, education, and experience. Older workers lose more
than younger workers because it is more difficult for them to relo-
cate and retrain.'3 Men lose more than women because they start
off with higher wages; however, women lose more than men as a
percentage of their wages. 39 Generally, more educated workers
lose less than less educated workers because the skills of educated
workers are more transferable than the skills of uneducated work-
ers. The least educated workers experience relatively minor losses,
however, likely because they work in the least human-capital in-
tensive occupations. " More experienced workers lose more than
' Id. at 15. There are tax subsidies for health insurance that also must be taken into
account in order to avoid double counting.16Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 111.
"' See Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfac-
tion, 15 Psychol. Sci. 8, 11 (2004) ("People were less satisfied in the years following
unemployment than they were before unemployment, and this decline occurred even
though individuals eventually regained employment.").
'3 White, supra note 130.
Couch & Placzek, supra note 129, at 584.
,0 See White, supra note 130, at 1855-56; von Wachter & Handwerker, supra note
134. at 9.
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less experienced workers because firm-specific human capital in-
141creases with tenure.
Layoff type. As noted above, the studies focus on mass layoffs
(at least 30% of the workforce) rather than individual layoffs. The
reason for this focus is that mass layoffs are more likely to be the
result of market factors than individual layoffs, which could reflect
an individual worker's abilities. If a firm fires a worker for incom-
petence, then the worker's wage decline is not a social loss: it sug-
gests instead that the worker was overpaid in the first place and
that the layoff will increase consumer or producer surplus. Accord-
ingly, a regulatory agency should ignore such a cost. However, it is
also possible that individual layoffs take place as a result of market
factors, including government intervention. Suppose an industry-
wide regulation causes one hundred firms to lay off two workers
each; that regulation might seem as socially harmful as a regulation
that causes a single two hundred-worker plant to close. Thus, it
would be wrong to direct agencies to include unemployment costs
in cost-benefit analyses only for proposed regulations likely to
cause mass layoffs but not for regulations that cause individual lay-
offs scattered among different firms.
A further complication is that even if individual layoffs are
costly, they may be less costly than mass layoffs because individu-
ally laid-off workers may have less trouble finding jobs than mass
laid-off workers do. Indeed, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
found that workers who lost their jobs in non-mass layoffs had no
earnings losses after six years, while those who lost their jobs fol-
lowing mass layoffs still had 25% earnings losses after six years.'42
In addition, first-year earnings losses for workers who lost their
jobs in non-mass layoffs were roughly half of earnings losses of
workers displaced in mass layoffs.'43 Couch and Placzek, using a dif-
ferent data set, found first-year earnings losses to be identical for
workers who lost their jobs in non-mass layoffs and workers dis-
placed in mass layoffs, but found that workers who lost their jobs in
141 Louis S. Jacobson et al., Is Retraining Displaced Workers a Good Investment?,
29 Econ. Persp., no. 2, 2005 at 47, 49 (2005) (finding that longer-tenured workers ex-
perience greater earnings losses following displacement); von Wachter et al., supra
note 126, at 12.
... See Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 697, 699.
"' Id. at 699.
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non-mass layoffs experienced earnings losses six years later of 7%
to 9% compared to 12% to 15% for workers displaced in mass lay-
offs.
1
"
4
The upshot is that agencies should determine whether the ex-
pected unemployment caused by proposed regulations will take the
form of mass layoffs or individual layoffs (or both), and use lower
figures when estimating earnings losses for individual layoffs than
for mass layoffs.
Industry characteristics: declining versus booming. Workers who
lose jobs in depressed industries will suffer greater long-term earn-
ings losses than workers who lose jobs in booming industries. The
reason is simply that it is easier to find a new job in a booming in-
dustry. Nonetheless, unemployment costs even in booming areas
turn out to be quite high. A study of California in the 1990s (when
the economy was booming) found that workers who lost jobs in
mass layoffs suffered an initial earnings loss of 15% to 20%. 4' That
loss was still evident four years after the displacement, though the
average worker in this data set did not appear to experience per-
manent effects of displacement.'4
4. Summary
Two lessons emerge from the discussion. First, unemployment
costs for workers are far from trivial. A conservative estimate is
that an average worker who loses his job in a mass layoff will suffer
earnings losses of more than $100,000 over the rest of his life, plus
a host of nonpecuniary costs including increased mortality and un-
happiness, which could be valued at as much as another $160,000.'
Second, unemployment costs for workers vary with the characteris-
tics of workers, such as age and experience and the industry in
which they are employed.
" See Couch & Placzek, supra note 129 (summarizing these results).
145 von Wachter & Handwerker, supra note 134, at 3, 7.
" Id. at 7. The study also found that the effects of displacement varied by industry.
Id. at 11.
141 We do not take a position on how best to determine this figure. An alternative
approach to the one described in this Article is to rely on unemployment insurance,
which contains an implicit valuation for a lost job. However, unemployment insurance
is typically determined by the government rather than by market conditions, and so it
may not accurately reflect the preferences of workers.
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E. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Unemployment
The figures from the previous Section are highly aggregated. Ac-
tual unemployment costs will vary across industry and region, and
also depend on demographic factors such as the age of the worker.
Ideally, agencies would use fine-grained detail in their cost-benefit
analyses. We would recommend the following procedure.
1. Estimate the number of workers who will lose their jobs as a result
of the regulation.
As MPS, the NHTSA, and others point out, regulation can have
three effects on the labor market. First, the regulation may in-
crease the cost of production, which the employer must normally
pass on in the form of higher prices to consumers. Anticipating
lower consumer demand at the higher prices, the employer reduces
production and lays off workers no longer needed for production.
Second, compliance with the regulation will often require the em-
ployment of additional workers, who are needed to (for example)
install scrubbers. Third, compliance with the regulation may be
more labor-intensive than the production activities that the firm
would otherwise undertake.1
8
Two further points need to be emphasized. First, the agency
must disaggregate these different effects. Because of the existence
of firm-specific human capital, laying off an assembly line worker
and hiring a new regulatory compliance worker is not necessarily a
wash. All else equal, the first worker will lose more than the sec-
ond worker will gain. Second, the agency must do the analysis for
the particular industry that is affected. This should go without say-
ing, but as we noted, the EPA uses the MPS results for regulations
that govern industries not included in the MPS study.'49
2. Estimate the costs to those workers.
These costs will depend on industry-, employer-, and worker-
specific factors. For example, if the industry is rapidly growing, the
worker will be able to find a new job quickly and so the cost will be
relatively low. The worker will lose firm-specific human capital but
148 Morgenstern et al., supra note 12, at 416.
1
49 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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not industry-specific human capital. By contrast, if the industry is
shrinking, the worker may well lose industry-specific as well as
firm-specific human capital. But this depends on what types of
workers lose their jobs. For example, factory workers in the (hypo-
thetical) shrinking paper mill industry will have trouble finding
new jobs. They will incur large costs in search and retraining. By
contrast, information technology workers in a paper mill will likely
be able to find a similar job in a different industry with relative
ease. Older workers may find it harder to retrain. Geographically
isolated workers may find it harder to travel to another location or
find a new job in the original location.
As noted above, the agency must distinguish "firing" and "hir-
ing" effects. A regulation that destroys one job but creates another
one will have a net negative effect if the first job involved firm-
specific human capital.
3. Coordinate with other regulators.
Agencies need to be aware of what other regulators are doing.
Unemployment is a social cost, but it is not obvious what is the best
tool (or combination of tools) for combating it. We have discussed
one tool: regulatory agencies could weaken regulations so as to
cause less short-term unemployment. Another tool is unemploy-
ment insurance, which does not prevent unemployment (and even
may extend it), but reduces the cost of unemployment for workers.
A third tool is macroeconomic policy, which is administered by the
Federal Reserve ("Fed"). The Fed can, for example, inflate the
money supply, which, at least in the short term, can bring down un-
employment (albeit with the long-term cost of possible inflation).
A fourth tool is fiscal policy, where the government borrows and
spends money on projects that require work.
These tools are currently used by different regulators. Regula-
tory agencies decide whether regulations should be weakened in
order to reduce unemployment. The Fed controls macroeconomic
policy. Congress (and state legislatures) determine the level of un-
employment insurance; they also control fiscal policy.'
"'0 For an overview, see Cong. Budget Office, Unemployment Insurance Benefits
and Family Income of the Unemployed 3-6 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/ll9xx/docll960/1 1-17-unemploymentinsurance.pdf.
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A significant danger is that regulators use these tools in an un-
coordinated way. Regulatory agencies, for example, might overes-
timate the cost of unemployment if they do not realize that the Fed
has implemented macroeconomic policies which will increase the
demand for labor. There is a substantial role for the OIRA or some
other centralized agency to play in coordinating policy.
F. Compensating Differentials and Unemployment Insurance
Economists hypothesize that employers pay a wage premium to
workers that compensate them for the risk of layoff."' Thus, all else
equal, workers in industries prone to layoffs should have higher
wages than workers in industries that are not prone to layoffs. This
"compensating differential" is, in effect, an insurance payout. The
evidence suggests the existence of a compensating differential,15' al-
though it is not clear whether it fully compensates workers for the
risk of layoff or only partially compensates them. Whether it does
or not, the compensating differential does not play a role in the
cost-benefit analysis or affect our argument in any way.
One might argue that if workers are compensated ex ante
against unemployment, the government should not take their un-
employment into account in cost-benefit analysis. Unemployment
is a harm, however, regardless of whether the worker is insured
against it. If, to use an extreme example, the government could
eliminate unemployment, that would be a good thing. The com-
pensating differential would fall to zero, which would save the em-
ployer money without harming the worker. Consider an analogy.
Suppose that an employer hires agricultural workers to work in a
floodplain that is subject to dangerous floods. The employers pay a
premium on the wage to compensate workers for the risk. If the
government could eliminate flooding by cheaply building levees,
:51 Borjas, supra note 120, at 224.
52 See James Adams, Permanent Differences in Unemployment and Permanent
Wage Differentials, 100 Q.J. Econ. 29, 52 (1985) (finding that wage premiums arise
for long-run unemployment differences, and that labor contracts accommodate long-
term anticipated unemployment, while short-run unemployment risks are shared by
the employer and the employee); Enrico Moretti, Do Wages Compensate for Risk of
Unemployment? Parametric and Semiparametric Evidence from Seasonal Jobs, 20 J.
Risk & Uncertainty 45, 63 (2000) (finding a positive compensating differential of
9.36% to 11.90% of the average wage, corresponding to an implicit replacement rate
significantly larger than the typical unemployment benefit).
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then the employer would stop paying the wage premium while the
workers would be made no worse off. If the cost of the levee is less
than the expected harm from the flooding, the government should
build the levee."3 The fact that workers might be "insured" against
risk by the wage premium does not mean that there is no social
harm if a flood occurs.
At the same time, agencies will have to take into account the
possible existence of compensating differentials when calculating
the welfare loss from unemployment. If a worker loses a high-
paying job and endures a period of unemployment, a portion of the
wage loss might represent the fact that the worker was being paid a
compensating differential at the old job to compensate for the risk
of unemployment. The worker's wage loss represents not only the
loss of firm- or industry-specific capital, but also the loss of this
compensating differential. The latter is not a social loss. Accord-
ingly, agencies must adjust downward their calculations of the wel-
fare loss from unemployment when firms are paying compensating
differentials. Nonetheless, the compensating differential does not
itself eliminate or even mitigate that social loss.
A related question concerns the relationship between unem-
ployment insurance and the incorporation of unemployment into
cost-benefit analysis. Currently, most workers benefit from unem-
ployment insurance. Unemployment insurance, like the compen-
sating differential, compensates workers who become unemployed,
with the difference that unemployment insurance provides a pay-
out ex post in the case of unemployment that must be paid for
ahead of time in the form of insurance premiums, while the com-
pensating differential increases the worker's ex ante wage, which
the worker can choose (or not) to save in order to provide self-
insurance against unemployment.
If the government incorporated unemployment costs into cost-
benefit analysis, then fewer or less stringent regulations would be
issued, with the result that unemployment would decline. As a re-
sult, the government's unemployment insurance payouts would de-
cline and unemployment insurance would be cheaper. As in the
153 In theory, compensating differentials could be used to calculate the ex post cost
of unemployment. However, the unemployment insurance system has largely
crowded out compensating differentials, so this information is probably lost.
[Vol. 98:579622
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levee analogy, the government should invest in the "project" of re-
ducing unemployment when the benefits exceed the costs, which is
exactly the effect that incorporating unemployment costs into cost-
benefit analysis would have. Thus, unemployment insurance pay-
outs are not additional costs that should be included in cost-benefit
analysis. Moreover, the existence of unemployment benefits does
not make it unnecessary to include unemployment costs in cost-
benefit analysis.
G. Objections
Some commentators might argue that if agencies should take
into account unemployment effects, then why stop there? Every
regulation produces effects that reverberate through the economy.
For example, an environmental regulation might cause a firm not
only to lay off workers, but also to buy fewer capital inputs (such as
machinery), which will harm shareholders and workers of the sell-
ers. And the sellers might themselves lay off workers, buy less from
other suppliers, and so on. And meanwhile it is possible that peo-
ple who stop purchasing from the firm might buy goods from firms
in more labor-intensive industries, which will increase employment,
offsetting at least partly the employment loss. Or it could be the
case that if the EPA regulated asthma-causing pollution more
stringently, for example, fewer workers would develop asthma and
be laid off because they could no longer perform their work.
Should not these costs and benefits be included in the cost-benefit
analysis as well?
The answer is yes in theory, but maybe not in practice.154 In the-
ory, agencies should take into account all the effects of regulation;
in practice, agencies rightly treat the effects as zero when they can-
not be determined. Agency reports already reveal that regulations
cost jobs; the only question is how to monetize these costs and in-
corporate them into cost-benefit analyses. Scholars and govern-
ment officials should also take into account the second-order costs
(and benefits) of regulations to the extent they can, but there are
no doubt diminishing returns as the effects of the regulation travel
further throughout the economy.
15 Indeed, the NHTSA, MPS, and others have estimated some of these second-
order effects. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
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A second objection concerns the ex ante effects of cost-benefit
analysis that incorporates unemployment costs. If agencies are
known to reduce the level of regulation because of unemployment
costs, various market actors will anticipate this outcome and act
strategically. For example, workers may overinvest in human capi-
tal because they expect the plants in which they work will be kept
open even if they cause environmental harm, or firms may overin-
vest in workers in order to ensure that an agency that might regu-
late the firms will be unable to do so because of the unemployment
costs. In general, one might argue that unemployment is merely a
transitional cost which should be ignored lest market actors over-
invest in the status quo.'55
The objection points out a general problem with cost-benefit
analysis, which is an ex post procedure: generally speaking, agen-
cies do not take into account the ex ante effects of regulation or the
ex ante effects of using cost-benefit analysis as a decision proce-
dure. Perhaps they should, but that is a topic for another paper.
However, in the present setting we suspect that the costs of ignor-
ing the ex ante effects of taking unemployment into account are
low. This is because firms will run significant risks if they attempt
to behave strategically. We do not propose keeping factories open
regardless of the amount of pollution that they produce. If the
benefits of shutting the factories down exceed the costs, then they
should be shut down. Thus, factory owners and workers know that
they face the risk of shutdown (and indeed they do, irrespective of
regulation, because of the risk of a market downturn in the rele-
vant industry). Taking into account these risks, factory owners and
workers will limit their investment in firm-specific capital. To be
sure, they would limit their investment even more if regulators did
not take into account unemployment costs, but the additional ef-
fect of this is likely marginal. Investing heavily in firm-specific capi-
tal might decrease the chances of regulation slightly, but it will
raise the costs of regulation to the regulated firm in the event that
regulation does occur.
"' See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
509, 529-31 (1986) (arguing that government should not compensate victims of tak-
ings so that they do not overinvest).
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In addition, any firm that attempted to shield itself from regula-
tion by overinvesting in workers or firm-specific capital would run
into a collective action problem. Agencies choose to regulate or
not regulate entire industries, not individual firms. 15'6 Thus, any firm
that attempted to make itself appear an unattractive target for
regulation would be benefiting the entire industry while imposing
costs only on itself. Firms are unlikely to be so generous. In fact,
any firm that takes these steps might find itself outcompeted by
more efficient firms in the short term and disappear before regula-
tion ever becomes an issue.'57 It would thus appear quite difficult
for any firm to strategically game the decision procedures we advo-
cate here.
Our proposal is modest, not radical, and in fact resembles other
government programs to address unemployment. For example,
economists generally agree that, in theory, the government can
help unemployed workers during times of high unemployment by
investing in projects like construction of bridges and highways. Be-
cause of the high rate of unemployment, the opportunity cost of
labor is zero; thus, the project should be undertaken as long as the
public values the improved infrastructure more than the cost in
taxes. It follows that the government should regulate less during
periods of high unemployment than during periods of low unem-
ployment. Regulating less is, in effect, a tax on the public (which
receives lower environmental and other regulatory benefits) that
benefits workers who would otherwise become unemployed and
incur significant unemployment costs.
A third objection stems from the theory of efficiency wages,
which holds that firms will pay workers a wage greater than the
competitive wage in order to encourage employees to work hard
because they will lose this surplus if they are fired.'58 Because the
wage is higher than the competitive wage, the number of workers
hired by the firm will be less than the number of workers who seek
the job, leading to unemployment. In this scenario, firms that lay
off workers confer a positive externality on other firms by reducing
the outside opportunities of employees of those other firms. In
56ee supra Part I; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 688-89.
157 Concerted effort by the industry would be targeted by antitrust authorities.
See Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 433, 433 (1984).
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theory, regulations that cause job loss could produce the same-
that is, positive-effect, and so job loss should not be considered a
reason for opposing a regulation.
This argument may or may not be correct; we are not sure. But
even if correct, it would apply only during periods where unem-
ployment is caused by efficiency wages and related effects (when
the "natural" rate of unemployment exists) and not during periods
where adverse macroeconomic conditions cause unemployment.
Therefore, if the argument were accepted, it would suggest that
unemployment costs should be folded into cost-benefit analysis
only during periods of recession.
III. UNEMPLOYMENT INTEGRATED WITH COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
What effect would unemployment costs have on regulatory cost-
benefit analysis? In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the ef-
fects we have described, we offer here a back-of-the-envelope re-
calculation of the cost-benefit analysis in the EPA's pulp and paper
regulation. Our goal is not to provide an independent assessment
of this regulation, but to use it as a vehicle for showing how agen-
cies should modify cost-benefit analysis to take into account unem-
ployment costs, and also for showing that the unemployment costs
involved are large enough to alter regulatory decisions.
In Part I, we mentioned that the EPA considered two regulatory
options for limiting emissions from pulp and paper plants. In fact,
the EPA also had the choice of regulating under the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") alone, or under the CWA and Clean Air Act
("CAA") in combination. Regulation under the CWA would limit
only waterborne pollution from pulp and paper factories; regula-
tion under both the CWA and CAA would limit both waterborne
and airborne pollution. The emissions standards become increas-
ingly stringent across regulatory options. Thus, CWA regulations
under Option 2 are more stringent than CWA regulations under
Option 1, and CAA regulations under Option 2 are more stringent
than CAA regulations under Option 1. Under any given option,
the CWA rule is the same irrespective of whether CAA regulation
is included. It is more accurate, then, to say that the agency had
four options in total: two regulatory options using only the CWA,
and those same two choices with the CAA added. In Table 3 be-
low, we summarize the EPA's estimates of the benefits (net of
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costs) under each of these options, the median expected net bene-
fits, and the unemployment that each regulation would create.
Table 3: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Annual Costs and Benefits of
ptions and Unemployment..9
Rules
Option 1 Option 2
Final Rule Alternate Rule #1
Individually w/CAA Individually w/CAA
Rule Rule
Annual Net ($250.9)- ($1,090)- ($312.0)- ($1,181)-
Benefits ($205.7) $1,144 (266.1) $1,054
(millions)
Annual ($228.3) $27 ($289) ($63.5)
Median Net
Benefits
(millions)
Total Job 3,094 5,711 5,711'm 9,877
Losses
Baseline:
90,840
The EPA chose Option 1 with the CAA rule included, which
appears to produce the greatest benefits net of costs. 6' Now, con-
sider how the cost-benefit analysis would change if unemployment
costs were included. We price unemployment at two different val-
ues: $35,000 per worker, which represents a low estimate of overall
costs, and $100,000 per worker. These prices represent the total
159 This table is compiled from data in the EPA's pulp and paper regulatory impact
analysis. See EPA, supra note 57, at 2-3, 2-29, 3-2, 4-23, 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 6-4
to 6-6, 6-15 tbl.6-4, 6-17 tbl.6-5, 6-34 tbl.6-14, 6-35 tbl.6-15, 6-44 tbl.6-19, 8-26 tbl.8-12,
8-27 tbl.8-13, 8-46 tbl.8-21.
" This is not a typographical error, and it seems to be pure coincidence that the job
loss for Option 1 with the CAA rule is the same as the job loss for Option 2 without
the CAA rule. See id. at 6-34 tbl.6-14, 6-35 tbl.6-15.
16 However, the EPA did not explicitly choose the rule for that reason. It did so, in-
stead, because it considered the other options infeasible. See National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,550-
51 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261, 430).
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lifetime costs of one worker becoming unemployed. However, the
figures we presented in Table 3 are the EPA's calculations of
yearly costs and benefits. The EPA annualized the costs of the
regulation over a thirty-year period.162 Accordingly, we divide the
lifetime costs of unemployment by thirty in order to obtain the an-
nual costs over that same thirty-year period. The results are re-
ported in Table 4:
Table 4: Pulp and Paper Regulation:
With Unemployment
63 Annual Costs and Benefits
Rules
Option 1 Option 2
Final Rule Alternate Rule #1
Individually w/CAA Individually w/CAA
Rule Rule
Annual Median ($228.3) $27 ($289) ($63.5)
Net Benefits
(millions)
Total Job 3,094 5,711 5,711 9,877
Losses
Baseline: 90,840
Annual Median
Net Benefits
with Unem-
ployment at
$35,000/worker
(millions) (231.9) 20.3 (295.7) (75.0)
Annual Median
Net Benefits
with Unem-
ployment at
$100,000/worker
(millions) (238.6) 8.0 (308.0) (96.4)
16 EPA, supra note 57, at 4-23.
1
63 This table is compiled from data in the EPA's pulp and paper regulatory impact
analysis. See id. at 2-3, 2-29, 3-2, 4-23, 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 6-4 to 6-6, 6-15 tbl.6-
4. 6-17 tbl.6-5, 6-44 tbl.6-19, 8-26 tbl.8-12, 8-27 tbl.8-13, 8-46 tbl.8-21.
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Even with unemployment costs included, Option 1 plus the
Clean Air Act rule still seems to be cost-benefit justified, though
only barely. If unemployment is priced at $100,000 per worker, the
net benefits are cut by more than two-thirds. Yet this calculation of
annual benefits is not the entire picture. The costs of the EPA's
regulation are likely to be felt in the relatively near term, as com-
panies are forced to switch to more expensive chemicals and proc-
esses. The benefits, on the other hand, will be slower to accrue. For
instance, the cases of cancer that will not occur because of the
EPA's regulation would only have arisen years into the future. As
a result, the total costs and benefits of the regulation, discounted to
present value, are not merely the annual costs and benefits multi-
plied by some number of years.
The EPA reports total costs and benefits only for Option 1 with
the CAA Rule-the regulatory option the agency selected. The
agency calculated the net present value of those benefits using both
a 3% discount rate and a 7% discount rate. In Table 5, we present
the EPA's calculations of total costs and benefits, which excluded
unemployment costs, and the true total costs and benefits with the
costs of unemployment included.
Table 5: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Total Net Costs and Benefits
of Option 1 With the CAA Rule at 7% and 3% Discount Rates in
Millions of 1995 Dollars"
7% Discount Rate 3% Discount Rate
Median benefits 5,067 7,722.5
Median costs (5,348) (7,563)
Benefits net of costs (excluding (281) 159.5
unemployment)
Benefits net of costs with Un- (480.9) (40.4)
employment at $35,000/worker1 65
Benefits net of costs with Un- (852.1) (411.6)
employment at $100,000/worker
"This table is compiled from data in the EPA's pulp and paper regulatory impact
analysis. See id. at 10-4 tbl.10-2.165The total lifetime costs of unemployment have already been discounted to pre-
sent value and need not be discounted again.
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This analysis of total costs and benefits reveals that Option 1
with the CAA Rule is no longer cost-benefit justified once even the
lower unemployment costs are figured into the equation. It appears
even less justified if unemployment is priced at the higher $100,000
figure. This does not mean that the EPA should not have regulated
at all, but it does suggest that it should have considered a weaker
regulation, one where the unemployment effects would not have
swamped the net benefits. After all, the EPA is not bound to con-
sider only a fixed set of alternatives. Regulatory options exist along
a continuum: the agency can always select a standard that is slightly
tougher or slightly more lenient than one it has considered and re-
jected. There could very well be a regulatory option, more lenient
than Option 1, that would result in less unemployment and thus
benefits that exceed costs. But because the EPA did not price the
costs of unemployment into its cost-benefit analysis, it may not
have realized that such an option was worth investigating.
Of course, as we have noted, not all job losses are equivalent. If
workers live in areas with many employment options, or if they
have easily marketable skills, they may be able to find new jobs
quickly and at minimal cost. On the other hand, if unemployed
workers have highly industry-specific skills and no prospects of be-
ing hired by other firms within the industry, unemployment may
persist, at high social cost. The EPA does not provide direct infor-
mation on the types of workers it believes will be laid off or their
geographic locations.166 However, as part of its feasibility analysis
the EPA does report the number of plants that will be forced to
close and the number of firms that will be bankrupted under each
regulatory alternative. It also reports the number of workers in the
pulp and paper industries who will be laid off as a direct result of
these plant closures and bankruptcies. (This is distinct from the to-
tal numbers of workers who will lose their jobs due to the direct
"In fact, there is some evidence that the EPA was restricted in the information it
could report by confidentiality concerns related to the industries being regulated. See,
e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category,
63 Fed. Reg. at 18,580 ("Estimates of job losses are not presented in order to protect
confidential business information."). Nonetheless, the EPA provides at least a hint
that it is aware that regulation may affect different localities differently. See EPA, su-
pra note 57, at 6-23, 6-24 tbl.6-8, 6-25 tbl.6-9 (describing county-by-county unem-
ployment effects). However, the EPA does not follow through on this analysis and
does not attempt to calculate effects by location.
r
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and indirect effects of the regulation, which are the figures we em-
ploy above.) Table 6 reports those figures. For firm bankruptcies,
the EPA only reported whether it believed there would be zero
bankruptcies in the industry or one or more bankruptcies. It did so
because it had already come to the conclusion that any regulation
that caused even one bankruptcy was economically infeasible. 67
We list the number of expected bankruptcies under those regula-
tory options as "1+" for lack of an exact figure.
Table 6: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Costs and Benefits, Unem-
ployment, Plant Closures and Firm Bankruptcies"
Rules
Option 1 Option 2
Final Rule Alternate Rule #1
Individu- w/CAA Individu- w/CAA
ally Rule ally Rule
Direct Job Losses 400 900 900 4,800
from Plant Closures
Baseline: 90,840
Plant Closures/Firm 1/0 2/0 2/1+ 4/1+
Bankruptcies
Median Net Annual
Benefits with Un-
employment at
$35,000/worker (mil-
lions) (231.9) 20.3 (295.7) (75.0)
Median Net Annual
Benefits with Un-
employment at
$100,000/worker
(millions) (238.6) 8.0 (308.0) (96.4)
Plant closures and firm bankruptcies are only proxies for the
true variable of interest, which is how costly it will be for an unem-
1
67 Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 685-86.
'6 This table is compiled from data in the EPA's pulp and paper regulatory impact
analysis. See EPA, supra note 57, at 2-3, 2-29, 3-2, 4-23, 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 64
to 6-6, 6-15 tbl.6-4, 6-17 tbl.6-5, 6-44 tbl.6-19, 8-26 tbl.8-12, 8-27 tbl.8-13, 8-46 tbl.8-21.
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ployed worker to find new employment. But we can draw some
useful inferences from even this limited information. First, if an en-
tire plant closes, it will likely mean that workers with industry-
specific skills have been fired.'69 Workers with industry-specific
skills will then have more difficulty finding work in another field.
Second, it is of course possible that layoffs will occur in a "one-
factory town" even if no plant actually closes. But plant closures
make this possibility more likely as well. Third, any given geo-
graphic region has some limited ability to absorb unemployed
workers into its labor force. That ability will vary based on the
population of the region and the economic diversity of the indus-
tries present in it. The greater the number of job losses concen-
trated in one region, the more costly it will be for those workers to
find new employment.'7 ° Higher numbers of plant closures and firm
bankruptcies suggest more highly concentrated layoffs, though
again the correlation is not perfect.
What does this say about the regulatory options the EPA con-
sidered? Option 1 (involving the CWA alone) again looks some-
what better in comparison to the combined CWA and CAA rule.
The CWA regulation alone would lead to only one plant closure;
the combined CWA and CAA rule would cause two plants to
close. On the other hand, the Option 2 combined CWA and CAA
rule improves somewhat in comparison to the Option 2 CWA rule
alone. The CWA rule would lead directly to 900 lost jobs and two
plant closures; the combined rule more than quintuples the number
of lost jobs (to 4,800) but only doubles the number of plant clo-
sures. This suggests that these additional 3,900 lost jobs may not be
as costly as the first 900. They might be spread more widely or be
distributed among employees with diverse skills, who will thus
more easily be reabsorbed into the workforce.
The important point is that the EPA and other agencies should
evaluate the cost of job loss directly by determining the options
available to particular workers who lose their jobs. The closure of a
plant in one region may be more costly than the closure of a plant
in another region. The loss of assembly line jobs may be more
"Scattered layoffs could more easily come from human resources or IT depart-
ments, where skills translate across industries.
' This rationale played a role in the Obama administration's response to the De-
troit automobile bankruptcies.
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costly than the loss of IT jobs. The EPA's failure to collect this in-
formation makes it impossible to evaluate the regulation, and the
cost of job loss could, in many normal cases, be substantial enough
to affect the choice among regulatory options.
CONCLUSION: THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND
OTHER GOODS
We make three main points. First, agencies' existing approaches
for addressing the unemployment effects of proposed regulations
are ad hoc and incoherent. Second, rather than use feasibility
analysis, job-loss analysis, or any other ad hoc procedure, agencies
should use cost-benefit analysis to account for the unemployment
effects of regulations. Third, contrary to conventional wisdom in
the cost-benefit literature, unemployment costs are significant and
cannot be ignored as rounding errors. Agencies should attempt to
quantify these costs as precisely as possible, including taking into
account how easily an industry can absorb regulatory costs, which
types of workers will be laid off, and whether they will be able to
find other jobs within the same industry. This includes the minor
point that would be too trivial to mention if it were not the case
that some agencies do not seem to understand it: when agencies es-
timate the effects of regulations on employment, they should take
into account the actual industry affected by the regulations and not
rely on the MPS study for industries to which it does not apply.
A comparison between feasibility analysis and cost-benefit
analysis may be instructive. Feasibility analysis directs an agency
not to issue a regulation if the unemployment effect exceeds a
(largely unarticulated) threshold. This procedure results in regula-
tory outcomes that differ in two ways from the regulatory out-
comes directed by cost-benefit analysis that accounts for unem-
ployment. First, consider a Regulation A, which produces large net
benefits but also causes unemployment above the threshold. Under
feasibility analysis, Regulation A is barred; under cost-benefit
analysis, Regulation A is permitted as long as the large net benefits
exceed the unemployment costs. Second, consider a Regulation B,
which produces small net benefits while causing unemployment be-
low the threshold. Under feasibility analysis, Regulation B is per-
mitted; under cost-benefit analysis, Regulation B is barred if the
small net benefits are less than the unemployment costs. We can
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think of no reason for believing that feasibility analysis produces
better results than cost-benefit analysis. By relying on artificial
thresholds, feasibility introduces a senseless discontinuity to regu-
lation.
At this stage, it is not clear whether agencies would, in aggre-
gate, regulate significantly less if they took account of unemploy-
ment effects in cost-benefit analysis. If agencies already refuse to
regulate when unemployment effects are likely to be high,'71 re-
gardless of what a cost-benefit analysis implies, then our proposal
would improve decision making but not, in the aggregate, reduce
regulation. Indeed, if agencies already attach too much weight to
unemployment costs (perhaps because of job-loss or feasibility
analysis), our proposal would result in greater regulation.
171 This is a possible interpretation of Morgenstern et al., supra note 12, at 429-30
(finding that environmental regulations created jobs, albeit at a statistically insignifi-
cant level).
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